intimate connection with the world. If at the beginning and in the end, the De Anima articulates a path of inquiry that takes its bearings from the beautiful things said concerning the soul and finds its voice in the eloquence of the human tongue, in the middle, we are made to feel the poignant aporia of touch and to experience the possibility that our inquiry might ultimately lose its way.
This inquiry into the nature of the soul, which itself is said to "contribute greatly toward all truth, and especially toward the truth concerning nature," proceeds along a familiar peripatetic path. Aristotle points to it in the De Anima when he writes:
While inquiring concerning the soul it is at the same time [ἅμα] necessary, while going through the impasses through which we must pass if we are going to move forward, to take along with us [συμπαραλαμβάνειν] the opinions of all our predecessors who declared something concerning the soul, so that we might take hold of the things that have been said beautifully while, if something was not said beautifully, we might beware of these.4
Already here, as at the end, the tongue, with its capacity to signify something to another, is felt to bear upon the well-being of the inquiry itself. This peripatetic path unfolds as legomenology in its most familiar guise: the attempt to articulate the truth by attending carefully to the things said well by those who came before.5 Book I of the De Anima is thus no prologue preceding but fundamentally divorced from the inquiry itself; rather, it is a prolegomenon in the more literal sense in which the inquiry itself proceeds as a collaborative endeavor between those who came before and we who continue to seek the truth concerning the nature of the soul. Thus, Aristotle's own peripatetic legomenology opens a determinate path for us into the received text; for if his inquiry proceeds in collaboration with his predecessors, ours ought also to proceed by attending carefully to the things Aristotle himself said beautifully even if we too must beware when something is not so said. The adverb, "καλῶς," here as throughout the De Anima, modifies a particular way of speaking, which is said to be beautiful precisely because it articulates something of the truth. The adverb itself appears most often in the De Anima in contexts in which Aristotle
